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 1 Introduction
This paper investigates the dynamic interactions between asset prices, monetary policy,
and aggregate ￿ uctuations during the Volcker-Greenspan period. We employ a simple
structural vector autoregression (SVAR) framework to answer three broad sets of impor-
tant questions, namely: (1) What are the e⁄ects of monetary policy on output, in￿ ation,
and asset prices? Furthermore, what are the di⁄erent roles played by monetary policy
shock versus systematic monetary policy? (2) How do asset prices interact with the ag-
gregate economy? (3) What is the dynamic relationship between stock price and house
price￿ the two asset prices considered in this paper? To this end we consider four speci￿ca-
tions based on short-run recursiveness identi￿cation schemes, along the line of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999, CEE henceforth), Iacoviello (2005), and Sims and Zha
(2006), among others. Our benchmark speci￿cation extends the CEE framework to in-
corporate asset prices. Under this ￿extended CEE￿speci￿cation, monetary policy reacts
contemporaneously to output and in￿ ation innovations but reacts to asset price movements
only with a lag. In contrast, under the ￿￿ exible monetary policy￿speci￿cation, monetary
policy is allowed to change in response to all non-policy shocks, while under the ￿sluggish
monetary policy￿and ￿extended Iacoviello￿speci￿cations, monetary policy respond to all
non-policy shocks with a lag. Extended Iacoviello di⁄ers from sluggish monetary policy
in whether output is ordered in front of or behind in￿ ation and asset prices.
In terms of dynamic responses to shocks, the following robust ￿ndings emerge: (1) A
positive shock to the federal funds rate, the monetary policy instrument in our SVARs,
2broadly leads to persistent declines in (real) house price, in addition to the fall in output
and in￿ ation, across the four speci￿cations. (2) A positive shock to stock price generates
a boom in output, while a positive house price shock leads to an initial increase (up to 7
quarters) and subsequent decline in output. Both asset price shocks generate persistent
increases in in￿ ation. On the other hand, house price responds negatively to output shocks.
(3) There are positive comovements between the two asset prices. That is, a positive house
price shock leads to an increase in stock price and vice versa.
Our variance decomposition results indicate that more than 60% of the variations in
the federal funds rate re￿ ect systematic responses of monetary policy to changes in the
state of the economy. Hence it is important to evaluate the roles played by the non-policy
variables in the setting of the monetary policy instrument, as well as the role played by the
systematic component of monetary policy in shaping the dynamic behavior of output, in-
￿ ation and asset prices. Regarding the monetary policy reaction function, we ￿nd that the
federal funds rate increases in response to positive in￿ ation shocks under all speci￿cations.
It responds positively to output shocks under extended CEE/￿ exible monetary policy but
shows no signi￿cant reaction under sluggish monetary/extended Iacoviello. Moreover, the
Fed does not appear to take asset price movements into direct account when setting the
federal funds rate. Nevertheless, asset price movements exert an indirect in￿ uence on pol-
icy setting through its e⁄ect on in￿ ation. In fact, the responses of the federal funds rate
to asset price shocks mimic the responses of in￿ ation to these shocks in a robust fashion.
To assess the role played by systematic monetary policy in the ￿ uctuations in the
aggregate economy and in asset prices, we follow Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997)
3and Sims and Zha (2006) to compare the impulse responses under the benchmark SVAR
and a counterfactual, which assumes that monetary policy does not respond to any of
the non-policy shocks. In general, the responses of output and in￿ ation to the structural
disturbances are smaller under the original SVAR, meaning that systematic monetary
policy does help smooth output and in￿ ation. Interestingly, systematic monetary policy
turns out to help stabilize house price, despite that the policy does not directly react to
house price movements. In fact, reacting only to output and in￿ ation movements allows
monetary policy to actually reduce house price ￿ uctuations to a large extent. In contrast,
the systematic monetary policy does not help stabilize stock price by much. Another
striking result is that the estimated systematic monetary policy succeeds in mitigating the
e⁄ects on output, in￿ ation and house price of unpredictable shifts in monetary policy, i.e.,
innovations to the federal funds rate. This implies that to the extent that disturbances
to monetary policy making are unavoidable, having a policy rule that dictates systematic
reactions of the policy instrument to output and in￿ ation movements actually helps avoid
some of the economy￿ s ￿ uctuations that would otherwise result from those disturbances.
An innovative aspect of our study is that it incorporates both stock price and house
price into an identi￿ed VAR framework that characterizes the dynamic interactions be-
tween asset prices, monetary policy and aggregate ￿ uctuations. The paper is related to
the empirical literature on the relationship between monetary policy, the business cycle,
and stock price/returns. Fama and French (1989) study the relationship between the ex-
pected returns on stocks and bonds and the business cycle. Built on Fama and French
(1989), Patelis (1997) ￿nds that monetary policy stances help forecasting stock returns
4considerably. Thorbecke (1997) employs VARs and the method of event study and ￿nds
that expansionary monetary policy leads to rises in stock returns. DeStefano (2004) ana-
lyzes the relationship between stock prices and the business cycle, using dummy variables
to represent di⁄erent phases of the business cycle. He ￿nds that stock prices are leading
indicators of the business cycle. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) investigate the relationship
between monetary policy and stock prices. They ￿nd that a 25-basis point decline in the
federal funds rate leads to about 1 percentage point increase in stock price indexes, and
that the e⁄ects of unanticipated monetary policy actions on expected excess stock returns
account for the largest part of the response of stock prices. Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock
(2007) study the relationship between monetary policy and stock market booms and busts
for post World War II U.S., U.K., and Germany by introducing qualitative variables into
VARs. They ￿nd that stock market booms are associated with episodes of high economic
growth and low in￿ ation, which are subsequently brought to an end by rises in in￿ ation
and tightening of monetary policy. They suggest that monetary policy that minimizes
in￿ ation volatility helps to stabilize ￿nancial markets.
There has been recently a growing interest in studying the dynamic interaction of
the housing market and the aggregate economy. Of particularly relevance to our study
are papers that involve both monetary policy and house price within VAR frameworks.
For example, Del Negro and Otrok (2007) use a VAR to investigate the extent to which
expansionary monetary policy is responsible for the increase in house prices in the U.S.
for the period 2001-2005. They ￿nd that the impact of policy shocks on house prices to
be small in comparison with the magnitude of the change in house prices in that period.
5Iacoviello and Minetti (2003) use VARs to study the role of monetary policy shocks in
house price ￿ uctuations in Finland, Sweden, and U.K.. They ￿nd that the response of
house prices to interest rate surprises is bigger and more persistent in periods characterized
by more liberalized ￿nancial markets. VARs are also employed by Iacoviello and Minetti
(2008) in their investigation of the credit channel of monetary policy in the housing markets
of Finland, Germany, Norway, and the U.K. These papers, however, do not involve stock
price. Incorporating both house price and stock price allows us to study their dynamic
relationship. Even if one is mainly interested in studying the interaction of house price
with monetary policy and aggregate ￿ uctuations, it might still be desirable to consider
stock price as well in the system in light of the mutual in￿ uence between these two asset
prices and their respective interactions with monetary policy and the aggregate economy.
Our results suggest that special attention should be paid to house price in macroeco-
nomic analyses. Asset price shocks, especially house price shock, ￿gure prominently in
generating in￿ ation volatility. They are in fact the most important sources of in￿ ation
￿ uctuations other than the shock to in￿ ation itself. House price shock is also the largest
source of stock price volatility other than the shock to stock price itself. In addition, there
appear to be a number of robust patterns found in the dynamic interactions between house
price and the aggregate economy, more so than in the interactions between stock price and
the aggregate economy. That is, house price appears to have more ￿connect￿with the
macroeconomy than stock price does. Recently there have been a growing number of works
studying the role of house price in business cycle ￿ uctuations and the transmission mecha-
nisms of monetary policy, such as Jin and Zeng (2004), Iacoviello (2005), Chen and Leung
6(2007), Jaccard (2009) and those surveyed in Leung (2004). Our results have implications
for the directions of future research along this line.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the speci￿cations
and the data. Section 3 presents the main results and robustness checks. The role of
systematic monetary policy is examined in Section 4. The last section concludes.
2 Speci￿cations
Our benchmark VAR consists of ￿ve quarterly endogenous variables, grouped in the vector
Zt = [Yt;￿t;Rt;qHt;qSt]
0, where Yt represents log real GDP, ￿t in￿ ation, Rt the federal
funds rate, qHt log real house price, and qSt log real stock price. Following common
practice in the literature, the federal funds rate is regarded as the policy instrument of the
Federal Reserve, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996, 1999), Bernanke and
Mihov (1998), Romer and Romer (2004), and Sims and Zha (2006), among many others.
The in￿ ation rate ￿t is the log di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator between time t and time t￿4,
following Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2004). Both ￿t and Rt are expressed in percent per
annum. Following Iacoviello (2005), we take the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index
(CMHPI) to be the measure of house price. Using the GDP de￿ ator to divide CMHPI
yields the real house price qHt used in our model. We use the Standard & Poor￿ s 500 index
(S&P500) as the measure of stock price in our benchmark speci￿cation, and use the GDP
de￿ ator to convert it into the real stock price qSt. All the variables are stationarized by
H-P ￿ltering with the smoothing parameter set to be 1600.1 The behavior of these ￿ve
1In Iacoviello (2005), the series are also ￿ltered before running VARs.
7variables is meant to represent in a concise manner the broad picture of monetary policy
setting, macroeconomic performance, and the ￿nancial aspects of the economy.2
We also add two types of exogenous variables to the model. The ￿rst type includes
the ￿rst and fourth lags of the log di⁄erence of the CRB/BLS Spot Price Index (see also
Iacoviello, 2005). A common perception in the literature is that the spot price index is
a leading indicator of the general price level. Adding the lagged values of this index as
an exogenous variable to the VAR system helps to resolve the so called ￿price puzzle￿ .3
The second type of exogenous variable is a dummy variable that is assigned the value 1
for the time period 2001Q1-2003Q1 and 0 otherwise. This dummy is added to capture
the exceedingly large e⁄ects on stock price of abrupt events like the burst of the dot com
bubble and the 911 event.
We adopt a variant of CEE￿ s short-run recursiveness identi￿cation scheme as our bench-
mark speci￿cation, whereby an innovation to a variable in the vector Zt is restricted to
have no contemporaneous impact on the variables ordered in front of it. Building on CEE,
we introduce asset prices to an SVAR system to study the interaction between monetary
policy, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. In particular, the vector Zt contains
three blocks: the k1 variables, X1t, whose contemporaneous values as well as lagged values
appear in the time-t information set of the monetary authority, denoted by ￿t, the k2
2The data sources are as follows. The federal funds rate is from the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm. The Con-
ventional Mortgage Home Price Index is from Freddie Mac: http://www.freddiemac.com/￿nance/cmhpi/.
The Stock price index is from ￿Online Data Robert Shiller￿ : http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.
Real GDP and GDP de￿ ator are from the Bureau of Economics Analysis: http://www.bea.gov.
3Without such a variable the general price level would rise, rather than fall, persistently after a monetary
contraction. Adding this variable allows the monetary authority to react quickly to changes in this leading
indicator of the business cycle and avoids the counter-intuitive responses of the price level to monetary
policy shocks. See Sims (1992).
8variables, X2t, which only appear with lags in ￿t, and ￿nally, the monetary policy instru-






￿0.4 In our baseline speci￿cation, St = Rt,
X1t = [Yt;￿t]
0, and X2t = [qHt;qSt]
0. The setting of monetary policy is thus represented by
the equation corresponding to Rt in the SVAR system. This implies that monetary policy
can equivalently be characterized by St = f (￿t) + "s
t, where f￿ the feedback rule￿ is
a linear function that relates St to the monetary authority￿ s time-t information set ￿t,
which contains the current and lagged values of X1t, the lagged values of X2t, as well as
the exogenous variables described above. The i.i.d. random variable, "s
t, is interpreted
a monetary policy shock. The part f (￿t) is regarded as the systematic component of
monetary policy.
The major di⁄erence of our model from CEE is that ours takes into consideration
of asset prices. Ordering asset prices [qHt;qSt]
0 to the bottom of Zt re￿ ects the notion
that these prices should be allowed to react contemporaneously to a monetary policy
shock. Asset prices, especially stock price, presumably adjust more quickly than other
variables. In fact, locating asset prices at the bottom of the system also allows them to
react contemporaneously to all other non-asset price shocks in the system. Furthermore,
placing qHt in front of qSt captures the idea that stock price is more ￿ exible than house
price. In particular, stock price reacts contemporaneously to all sorts of shocks to the
economy, while house price reacts contemporaneously to all shocks except the shock to
stock price. There is thus a lag for stock price innovations to a⁄ect house price. In
4This ordering re￿ ects the assumption that the policy maker does not see X2t when St is set, and
that the monetary policy shock is orthogonal to the elements in X1t as the shock is assumed to have no
contemporaneous e⁄ect on each element in X1t.
9e⁄ect, stock price is treated as the most responsive variable in the system, while output
and in￿ ation are treated as the most sluggish, which re￿ ects the common perception that
changing the quantities and prices of most goods and services is subject to various sorts
of adjustment costs.
In the monetary policy equation, i.e., the equation corresponding to the variable Rt,
the federal funds rate depends on current and lagged values of output Yt and in￿ ation
￿t. In addition, there is potential dependence of Rt on (lagged) values of house price
qHt and stock price qSt. That is, we allow in principle for the possibility that monetary
policy reacts to perceived development in asset markets. If any of the coe¢ cients on asset
prices in the monetary policy equation turns out to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero,
then we say that historically the Fed did take into account asset prices in policy making.
Otherwise the Fed is regarded as having ignored asset price movements when setting the
federal funds rate target. Section 4.1 is devoted to this issue.
An immediate question under the short-run recursiveness assumption is the robustness
of the results under di⁄erent ordering of variables. To answer this question, we also
consider three alternative short-run recursiveness based identi￿cation schemes. Hence in
total we consider the following four speci￿cations:
1. Extended CEE (baseline speci￿cation): Zt = [Yt;￿t;Rt;qHt;qSt]
0.
2. Flexible monetary policy: Zt = [Yt;￿t;qHt;qSt;Rt]
0.
3. Sluggish monetary policy: Zt = [Rt;Yt;￿t;qHt;qSt]
0.
4. Extended Iacoviello: Zt = [Rt;￿t;qHt;qSt;Yt]
0.
Under ￿ exible monetary policy, the federal funds rate is permitted contemporaneous
10responses to all sorts of shocks. This speci￿cation is useful to look at for the following
reason. We ￿nd under extended CEE that systematic monetary policy in the U.S. did
not historically take asset price movements into account. We want to make sure that
this ￿nding does not rely on ruling out contemporaneous responses of the federal funds
rate to asset price movements as in extended CEE. Such contemporaneous responses are
allowed for under ￿ exible monetary policy, where the federal funds rate is ordered last
in the vector Zt. Nevertheless, we fail to ￿nd signi￿cant responses of monetary policy to
asset price movements even under ￿ exible monetary policy, and are led to conclude that
historically the federal funds rate did not respond directly to asset price movements.
In the CEE scheme output and in￿ ation are assumed to be unresponsive to current-
period monetary policy shocks, but are allowed to exert contemporaneous in￿ uences on
the setting of the monetary policy instrument. Several authors, such as Sims and Zha
(2006) and Iacoviello (2005), have proposed the opposite view that monetary policy does
not respond contemporaneously to disturbances in in￿ ation or real GDP. The argument
for this view is based on the absence of contemporary data on these variables at the time
policy decisions have to be made. Under the third and four speci￿cations, namely sluggish
monetary policy and extended Iacoviello, the federal funds rate occupies the ￿rst place in
the vector Zt. Hence under these speci￿cations the funds rate cannot respond to current-
period innovations to all the other variables. In Extended Iacoviello, output is moved to
the last position in Zt. This speci￿cation is, as its name suggests, an extended version of
the SVAR system considered in Iacoviello (2005), where Rt;￿t;qHt; and Yt, but not qSt,
are included. The speci￿cation considered here di⁄ers from his in that we incorporate both
11house price and stock price. This allows us to analyze the dynamic relationship between
house price and stock price. Even if one is mainly interested in studying the dynamic
interaction of house price with monetary policy and aggregate ￿ uctuations, it might still
be desirable to consider stock price as well in light of the mutual in￿ uence between these
two asset prices and their respective interactions with monetary policy and the aggregate
economy.
We use the following notations throughout the paper. The matrices A1;:::;Ap refer to
the coe¢ cient matrices on Zt￿1;:::;Zt￿p in the implied reduced-form VAR. ￿ denotes the
variance-covariance matrix of the vector of reduced-form residuals. The lower-triangular
matrix A0 captures the contemporaneous interactions among the endogenous variables in
the SVAR. Finally, ￿ is used to denote the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of
structural disturbances.
Our sample period covers 1979Q3-2006Q1, which is chosen based on the following
considerations. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (CGG, 2000) ￿nd that the Fed policy from
1960s onward can be divided into two periods￿ the pre-Volcker period and the Volcker-
Greenspan period. According to CGG, the pre-Volcker period, which ended in August
1979 when Volcker took o¢ ce, was characterized by ￿accommodative￿monetary policy
whereby the nominal interest rate is raised by less than one-for-one with in￿ ation, giving
rise to self-ful￿lling in￿ ation expectations. In contrast, the Volcker-Greenspan period5
was characterized by ￿aggressive￿monetary policy whereby the nominal interest rate is
raised by more than one-for-one with in￿ ation, so that both in￿ ation and output are better
5Volcker from August 1979 to August 1987, and Greenspan from September 1987 to January 2006.
12stabilized. Since we want to look at a historical period where monetary policy is conducted
in a relatively consistent manner, i.e., without major structural breaks in the way policy is
conducted, we choose to work with the Volcker-Greenspan period. The same consideration
leads us to defer to future research investigation of the recent Global Financial Crisis.
During the Crisis monetary policy appeared to be ￿unconventional.￿(See Cecchetti, 2009,
and Reis, forthcoming, among others.) Investigating the interactions between asset prices,
the unconventional monetary policy, and aggregate economic ￿ uctuations is undoubtedly
a topic of immense importance. We nevertheless opt to focus the present paper on a
historical period with a more or less consistent policy rule. The analysis in this paper is
thus more about the normal time of business of monetary policy making.
Table 1 summaries the second moments of the variables in our SVARs. It is apparent
that real house price is modestly more volatile than real GDP, while real stock price is
much more volatile than any other variable. The standard deviation of real stock price is
more than 6 times the standard deviation of real house price. Moreover, output, in￿ ation,
real stock price, real house price, and the federal funds rate are all positively correlated,
except for that the correlation between in￿ ation and real stock price is nearly zero.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
It is typical in the VAR literature to select the number of lags according to Akaike
information criterion (AIC) or Schwarz information criterion (SIC). For our model AIC
suggests the number of lags to be 3 while SIC suggests 1. As a compromise we take the
number of lags to be 2 for the benchmark. We do check the robustness of our results
13against the number of lags.
3 Results
The results presented in this section are organized into three broad categories, namely,
(1) the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks on output, in￿ ation, and asset prices (2) the
interaction of asset prices with the aggregate economy, and (3) the dynamic relationship
between stock price and house price. Since our results are broadly robust across the
four speci￿cations, the presentation below focuses on the benchmark speci￿cation, i.e.,
extended CEE. The results under this speci￿cation are described in Sections 3.1-3. The
similarities and di⁄erences under the other three speci￿cations will be discussed in Section
3.4.
3.1 The E⁄ects of Monetary Policy Shock
As mentioned earlier, the setting of the monetary policy instrument can be thought of
comprising two parts: the anticipated component and the shock component. The antici-
pated part corresponds to f (￿t) and re￿ ects the federal funds rate￿ s systematic response
to changes in the variables contained in the monetary authority￿ s information set, ￿t,
which includes the current and lagged values of output and in￿ ation and the lagged values
of asset prices, as well as the exogenous variables. The policy shock is simply the random
disturbance "s
t. The systematic and shock components of monetary policy play very dif-
ferent roles. Here we look at the e⁄ects of the monetary policy shock. The discussion of
the role played by systematic monetary policy is deferred to Section 4.
14Figure 1 displays the impulse responses with 90% con￿dence intervals.6 The third
column displays the impulse responses to a one standard deviation (78 basis points) shock
to the federal funds rate. In response to such a contractionary monetary policy shock,
there is widespread contraction in the economy: output, in￿ ation, stock price, and house
price all decline. Output initially changes little and reaches a peak decline of 0:24 percent
three quarters after the shock. The output contraction persists for about two years. The
decline in in￿ ation appears to be slow and modest, with the maximum decline being 0:06
percentage point. The behavior of output and in￿ ation responses to a monetary policy
shock is in line with CEE, suggesting that their results are robust against the introduction
of asset prices.
The e⁄ects of the monetary policy shock on stock price and house price are both
negative, with noticeable di⁄erences. First, stock price declines by a much greater extent.
The peak decline of house price is 0:24 percent, a magnitude equal to the peak decline in
real GDP, while the peak decline of stock price is as large as 1:29 percent. Second, the
decline of house price is more persistent than stock price. The peak decline of stock price
occurs at the same period of the monetary policy shock, while the largest decline of house
price occurs two quarters after the shock. In fact, the decline in house price shares the
hump-shaped pattern with the decline in real GDP. Third, although the decline in house
price is much smaller, its impulse responses are more precisely estimated than those of
stock price.
6The con￿dence intervals for the impulse responses are computed by the Monte Carlo method. See
Davidson and McKinnon (2004).
15[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
The contributions of monetary policy shock to the volatilities of output, in￿ ation,
and asset prices can be quantitatively gauged using forecast error variance decomposition.
The results are displayed in Table 2. As the forecast horizons tend to in￿nity, the results
correspond to unconditional variance decomposition. It is apparent that after the 4-
quarter forecast horizon monetary policy shock accounts for around 17% of the volatility
of real GDP, and for around 10% of in￿ ation volatility. Therefore monetary policy shock
seems to play important roles in output and in￿ ation ￿ uctuations, consistent with CEE.
In addition, the contribution of monetary policy shock to the forecast error variance of
house price stays around 17% among the contribution from all shocks after the 4-quarter
forecast horizon, while its contribution to the forecast error variance of stock price remains
around 8% . These results indicate that monetary policy shock is an important source
of house price volatility, and that its contribution to house price volatility is much larger
than its contribution to stock price volatility.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
3.2 Asset Prices and Aggregate Fluctuations
Figure 1 also reveals important interactions between asset price movements and aggregate
economic ￿ uctuations. A one-standard deviation shock to stock price (resp. house price)
produces a maximum output increase of 0:25 (resp. 0:09) percentage point. It would
be tempting to conclude that stock price movements exert larger impacts on output than
house price movements. Yet it should be noticed that the standard deviation of stock price
16shock (5:94 percent) is far greater than that of house price (0:55 percent). If the shocks
to these two asset prices were of the same magnitude, say 1 percent, then the in￿ uence
of the house price shock on output would be far greater than the in￿ uence of the stock
price shock. We also see from the ￿gure that both asset price shocks stimulate in￿ ation.
The peak in￿ ation response to a one standard deviation shock to house price (resp. stock
price) is 0:10 (resp. 0:07) percentage point. The responses are quite persistent. In the
other direction, both output and in￿ ation shocks produce a decline in house price. In
contrast, there is no discernible response of stock price to output shock, while stock price
responds positively to in￿ ation shock.
The mutual in￿ uences between asset price movements and macroeconomic ￿ uctuations
can again be quantitatively gauged by forecast error variance decomposition. Table 2
indicates that the contributions of output shock to the volatilities of both house price and
stock price are very limited, with a maximum of 5:56% for house price and a maximum of
3:36% for stock price in the in￿nite horizon. However, the contributions of in￿ ation shock
to asset price volatilities are considerably larger, with 13:04% for house price and 9:19%
for stock price in the unconditional variance decompositions.
In contrast to the small contributions of output shock to asset price volatilities, shocks
to asset prices turn out to be important sources of output ￿ uctuations. Although house
price shock accounts for small portions of the forecast error variance for output at short
horizons, its contribution to overall output volatility is above 13% in long horizons. The
contribution of stock price shock to output forecast error variance ranges between 15% and
20% ever since the 4-quarter horizon. Furthermore, asset price shocks, especially house
17price shock, ￿gure prominently in generating in￿ ation volatility. They are in fact the most
important sources of in￿ ation ￿ uctuations other than the shock to in￿ ation itself. In the
unconditional variance decomposition, house price shock and stock price shock contribute
21:92% and 12:93% respectively to in￿ ation volatility, while monetary policy shock and
output shock accounts for only 11:43% and 4:36% respectively.
3.3 The Comovement between House Price and Stock Price
Another important message from the impulse responses displayed in Figure 1a is that
asset prices exhibit positive comovement, i.e., a positive shock to stock price drives house
price up and vice versa. In particular, a one standard deviation shock to house price
leads to a maximum increase in stock price by close to 2 percent, while the maximum
response of house price to a one standard deviation shock to stock price is about 0:20
percent. There are various reasons for the positive comovement between house price and
stock price. First, an increase in the price of one asset raises the wealth of households and
￿rms, thereby pushing up the demand and hence the price for the other asset through a
direct wealth e⁄ect. Second, the increase in the price of any asset raises the net worth
of households and ￿rms and hence strengthens their balance sheets. This allows them to
borrow more at lower costs, which stimulates investment and bids up asset prices. Third,
an increase in stock price might trigger the expectation that house price will also increase,
and vice versa, leading to expectation-driven movements in asset prices.
The variance decomposition in Table 2 shows that more than 50% of forecast error
variance of asset price, be it house price or stock price, is attributable to the shock to that
18asset price itself, which leaves relatively little to be explained by other shocks. Still, house
price and stock price exhibit interesting interaction with each other. In the unconditional
variance decomposition for house price, the contribution from stock price shock is 11:68%,
larger than the contribution from output shock and only slightly smaller than the contri-
bution from in￿ ation shock. In the unconditional variance decomposition for stock price,
the contribution from house price shock is 14:31%. In fact, house price shock is the largest
source of stock price volatility other than the shock to stock price itself. The contribution
of house price shock to stock price volatility is considerably larger than the contribution
from monetary policy, in￿ ation, or output shock. Note that house price shock is more
important in explaining stock price volatility than the other way round. For house price,
monetary policy shock is the largest source of ￿ uctuations other than the shock to house
price itself.
3.4 Robustness
In the previous subsections we have taken the CEE scheme extended to include asset
prices as the baseline identi￿cation scheme, which is based on the notion of short-run
recursiveness. For short-run recursiveness identi￿cation schemes the inference results de-
pend to various extents on the ordering of the variables included in the SVAR. Hence it
is important to assess the robustness of our results against di⁄erent ordering of variables.
Regarding the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks, a positive federal funds rate shock
broadly leads to output contraction and decline in in￿ ation across all the four speci￿ca-
tions. However, there are initial increases in output and in￿ ation when monetary policy
19is sluggish (sluggish monetary policy and extended Iacoviello). These initial increases are
absent under extended CEE and ￿ exible monetary policy. Under all the four speci￿ca-
tions house price declines in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks. Stock
price declines under extended CEE and extended Iacoviello. It is almost unresponsive
under ￿ exible monetary policy and even increases under sluggish monetary policy. Thus
the decline in house price appears to be a more robust feature than the decline in stock
price. Moreover, the response of stock prices are less precisely estimated.
The e⁄ects of asset price shocks on output and in￿ ation are quite robust across the
speci￿cations. A positive house price shock leads to an initial increase (up to 7 quarters)
and subsequent decline in output. The (positive) output e⁄ects generated by stock price
shocks appear to be stronger. Both asset price shocks generate persistent increases in
in￿ ation.
Looking at the e⁄ects of output and in￿ ation shocks on asset prices, house price re-
sponds negatively to output shocks under all speci￿cations. Stock price is almost unre-
sponsive to output shock under extended CEE and ￿ exible monetary policy, as well as
in extended Iacoviello. It shows an imprecisely estimated decline in response to output
shock under sluggish monetary policy. As for the e⁄ects of in￿ ation shocks, house price
responds negatively to such shocks under extended CEE and ￿ exible monetary policy. Its
responses are less clear-cut under sluggish monetary policy and extended Iacoviello: It
increases after a short, small initial declines under these two speci￿cations. On the other
hand, stock price increases in response to in￿ ation shock under extended CEE, ￿ exible
monetary policy, and extended Iacoviello. It shows little response under sluggish monetary
20policy.
Turning to the comovement of asset prices, a positive shock to house price stimu-
lates increases in stock price, and vice versa across all speci￿cations. Thus the positive
comovement between house price and asset price turns out to be robust.
The variance decomposition results are broadly robust across the speci￿cations.7 For
the forecast error variances of output, the results are quite similar between extended
CEE and ￿ exible monetary, as well as between sluggish monetary policy and extended
Iacoviello. Extended CEE/￿ exible monetary policy di⁄ers from sluggish monetary policy
and extended Iacoviello at short-forecast horizons (the ￿rst two quarters). Under sluggish
monetary policy/extended Iacoviello, the federal funds rate shock accounts for some (about
15%) of the forecast error variance of real GDP over short horizons, whereas the funds rate
shock accounts for virtually nothing of the forecast error variance of output over the same
horizons under extended CEE/￿ exible monetary policy. The gain in the contribution of
federal funds rate shock when we switch from sluggish monetary policy/extended Iacoviello
to extended CEE/￿ exible monetary policy obtains at the expense of the contribution of
the shock to output itself. Similar comparison of results obtains for the forecast error
variances of in￿ ation.
The results for the variance decomposition for the forecast error variances of house
price are similar among extended CEE, sluggish monetary policy, and extended Iacoviello.
Compared to these three speci￿cations, the contribution of monetary policy shock to the
7To save space, the variance decomposition results for ￿ exible monetary, sluggish monetary policy and
extended Iacoviello are not shown. They are available from the authors upon request.
21forecast error variance of house price is much smaller under ￿ exible monetary policy at
all forecast horizons. The same thing can be said for the forecast error variances of stock
price.
Within the extended CEE scheme, we have defended ordering stock price qSt behind
house price qHt on the basis that the former is more ￿ exible than the latter. Although
we regard this assumption as quite plausible, we nevertheless verify the robustness of our
results against rearranging the relative ordering of these two asset prices in the SVAR
system. We ￿nd that the impulse responses when house price is ordered behind stock
price are similar to those under the baseline speci￿cation. The major di⁄erence is that
under the perturbed ordering stock price does not react contemporaneously to house price
shock by restriction, while house price changes in the period when the stock price shock
occurs.
The other robustness checks we have conducted include: (1) changing the number of
lags from 2 to 3 (as AIC indicates), (2) using the consumer price index (CPI) instead of
GDP de￿ ator to de￿ ate nominal asset prices, and (3) using the American Stock Exchange￿ s
AMEX index to replace the S&P500 index as the measure of stock price. Broadly speaking,
the results remain robust against these changes.
224 Systematic Monetary Policy
4.1 The Reaction Function and the Funds Rate Volatility
The SVAR with short-run recursiveness assumption implies a rule for monetary policy
setting represented by an equation of the form:
Rt = eR (A1Zt￿1 + ￿￿￿ + ApZt￿p + CWt + A0"t);
where eR is the 1 ￿ n unit vector with one on the place corresponding to Rt and zero
otherwise (multiplying eR with a particular coe¢ cient matrix gives the the row in that
matrix that corresponds to the position of Rt in the vector Zt). Table 3 lists the A matrices
under the four speci￿cations.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
The A1 and A2 matrices in the reduced form VARs are the same under all speci￿cations,
up to permutation of the rows and columns in accordance with the ordering of variables.
Looking at the monetary policy equation, although none of the coe¢ cients on lagged
non-policy variables is statistically signi￿cant at the 90% level of con￿dence, the point
estimates and t-statistics for the coe¢ cients on lagged output and in￿ ation far exceed the
point estimates and t-statistics for the coe¢ cients on lagged house price and stock price.
The coe¢ cients on lagged asset prices are all close to zero, while the coe¢ cient on output
is quite large for the ￿rst lag and the coe¢ cient on in￿ ation is large even for the second
lag. The ￿rst lag of in￿ ation takes the largest coe¢ cient within the rows of A1 and A2
matrices that correspond to Rt.
23The contemporaneous reactions of monetary policy to changes in non-policy variables
are captured in the rows of the A0 matrices that correspond to Rt. Under extended CEE,
both output and in￿ ation have positive contemporaneous impacts on the federal funds
rate that are statistically signi￿cant at the 95% level of con￿dence. On the other hand,
the identi￿cation assumption of extended CEE implies that the federal funds rate does
not react contemporaneously to movements in asset prices (qHt and qSt). Given that the
lagged values of asset prices do not exert signi￿cant impact on the federal funds rate (as
shown in the A1 and A2 matrices), we are lead to the conclusion that monetary policy
does not respond systematically to asset price movements, though they do react to output
and in￿ ation movements in a systematic fashion.
It is possible that the above conclusion hinges on the assumption of extended CEE that
permits contemporaneous reactions of monetary policy to output and in￿ ation movements
but deprives the federal funds of reactions to asset price movements at the same time. To
verify whether this is the case we look at the last row in the A0 matrix under ￿ exible
monetary policy, when contemporaneous reactions of monetary policy to all non-policy
variables are allowed. It is clear that output and in￿ ation again have signi￿cantly positive
coe¢ cients. Furthermore, the values of these coe¢ cients are almost identical to those
under extended CEE. A one-percent increase in real GDP leads to an increase in the
federal funds rate by about 0:32 percentage point, while a one percentage point increase
in in￿ ation results in an increase in the federal funds rate by about 0:19 percentage point.
On the other hand, the coe¢ cients on current asset prices seem to have the ￿wrong￿sign.
They are negative for both house price and stock price. However, the negative coe¢ cient
24on current house price appears to be insigni￿cant at the 90% level of con￿dence. The
negative coe¢ cient on stock price is signi￿cant at 90% con￿dence but insigni￿cant at the
95% level, whereas the positive coe¢ cients on output and in￿ ation are both signi￿cant at
95% level of con￿dence.
The sluggish monetary policy and extended Iacoviello speci￿cations by assumption
rule out any contemporaneous reactions of monetary policy to movements in asset prices.
Hence we are led to the conclusion, after examining the results under the four speci￿ca-
tions, that monetary policy does not react systematically to asset price movements during
the Volcker-Greenspan period. Note that under sluggish monetary policy and extended
Iacoviello neither output nor in￿ ation, current or lagged, has statistically signi￿cant im-
pact on monetary policy setting. In contrast, signi￿cant impacts of output and in￿ ation
on the federal funds rate are well captured by extended CEE (and ￿ exible monetary policy
as well). These results suggest that restricting monetary policy to respond only sluggishly
to all non-policy variables results fails to deliver a policy reaction function in a statis-
tically signi￿cant fashion. Although Sims and Zha (2006) motivates their restriction on
monetary policy response to contemporaneous disturbances to output and the price level,
they acknowledge the fact that policy makers obviously have other sources of information
about the economy than the published data, and might have a strong interest in using it
to get accurate assessments of the state of the economy. Hence monetary policy is not
likely to be entirely sluggish.
Looking at the impulse responses (Figures 1a-d), the federal funds rate increases in
response to positive in￿ ation shocks under all speci￿cations. There are sizable increases
25in the federal funds rate in response to a positive output shock under extended CEE
and ￿ exible monetary policy. Under sluggish monetary policy and extended Iacoviello the
federal funds rate has only modest increases in response to a positive output shock. Under
the latter two speci￿cations, the federal funds rate is denied contemporaneous responses
to this shock, and its subsequent responses do not appear to be strong.
Interestingly, the responses of the federal funds rate to asset price shocks mimic the
responses of in￿ ation to these shocks in a robust fashion. Under extended CEE, sluggish
monetary policy, and extended Iacoviello, the federal funds rate by assumption has no
contemporaneous reaction to asset price shocks but increases persistently after the shock
period. Under ￿ exible monetary policy, where contemporaneous reactions of the federal
funds rate to asset price shocks are allowed for, there are negative, yet insigni￿cant initial
responses of the federal funds rate to positive asset price shocks. After that, the federal
funds rate again is persistently above the pre-shock level.
The last block of Table 2 shows the forecast error variance decomposition for the fed-
eral funds rate under the benchmark speci￿cation, i.e., extended CEE. For short forecast
horizons, monetary policy shock is the dominant source of federal funds rate variability.
Output and in￿ ation shocks have signi￿cant in￿ uences on the federal funds rate, while
asset price movements only have negligible in￿ uences. Over time in￿ ation shock gains
importance. And house price and stock price shocks exert signi￿cant impacts on federal
funds rate variability over long forecast horizons. In the unconditional variance decom-
position, monetary policy shock accounts for about 38% of federal funds rate volatility,
in￿ ation shock accounts for about 23%, output shock, house price shock and stock price
26shock each accounts for something in between 12% and 14%. These results indicate that
unpredictable shifts in monetary policy account for less than 40% of variations in the value
assumed by the monetary policy instrument, and that the bulk of monetary policy actions
have historically been systematic reactions to the state of the economy, rather than un-
predictable changes. Although asset price shocks have little in￿ uence on the federal funds
rate in the short run, over time they exert more and more in￿ uences on the policy rate
through their in￿ uences on output and in￿ ation. Hence despite the lack of direct response
of monetary policy to asset price movements, these movements are not to be neglected
when accounting for the volatility of the federal funds rate. In fact, each of the two asset
price shocks is as important as output shock in the long run.
The variance decomposition results for the forecast error variances of the federal funds
rate are similar between extended CEE and ￿ exible monetary, as well as between sluggish
monetary policy and extended Iacoviello. Extended CEE/￿ exible monetary policy di⁄ers
from sluggish monetary policy/extended Iacoviello in that the contributions of output
and in￿ ation shocks to federal funds rate volatility is considerably higher under extended
CEE/￿ exible monetary policy at all forecast horizons. This is especially true for output
shock and for shorter forecast horizons.
4.2 Has Monetary Policy Helped Stabilize the Aggregate Economy and
Asset Prices?
Given that the bulk of monetary policy actions have historically been systematic reactions
to the state of the economy, rather than unpredictable changes, assessment of the overall
e⁄ects of monetary policy, as opposed to merely the e⁄ects of unpredictable changes in
27policy, must therefore consider what would happen if the systematic component of mon-
etary policy were di⁄erent. This is done by analyzing the impulse responses for a system
in which the model￿ s estimated monetary policy reaction function is replaced by one in
which the monetary policy instrument is completely unresponsive to other variables in the
system, that is, the monetary authority holds the monetary policy instrument such as the
federal funds rate ￿xed in face of non-policy disturbances.
The idea of the counterfactual experiment is that we take the estimated benchmark
recursive SVAR as the ￿true￿model. That is, we take the estimated A0;A1;:::;Ap, and ￿ ￿
E("t"0
t) as true parameters. We then perform a thought experiment on the true system,
in the spirit of ￿ceteris paribus￿ . In particular, we keep intact ￿ and the non-monetary-
policy rows of A0;A1;:::;Ap. We then change the monetary-policy rows of A0;A1;:::;Ap
by setting the coe¢ cients on the current and lagged values of all variables other than
the federal funds rate to be zero. The coe¢ cients on lagged federal funds rate are kept
unchanged. In doing so we take the structure of the economy, which is represented by ￿
and the non-monetary-policy rows of the A matrices, as given, but change the nature of the
monetary policy. Similar counterfactual experiments have been performed by Bernanke,
Gertler, and Watson (1997) and Sims and Zha (2006), in contexts that do not involve
asset prices.
Holding all equations of the system other than the monetary policy equation ￿xed
means that we are ignoring changes in the dynamics of the private sector that would
occur if private agents modi￿ed the way they forecast the economy under the new policy
rule. That is, we are not thinking of the change in agents￿belief in the policy rule and
28its impact on their behavior, as the Lucas critique emphasizes, as being important for
our purpose. Sims and Zha (2006) argue that this is nonetheless an interesting exercise,
for practical purposes even more interesting than an exercise that ￿takes account of￿the
Lucas critique via the ￿unreasonable￿assumption that the policy change is immediately
and fully understood and that the public believe that the change is permanent. Our
counterfactual exercise therefore rests on the assumption that policy changes, but private
agents are surprised by the change, even though it is in a systematic fashion. Relatedly,
Leeper and Zha (2003) argue that if policy interventions are ￿modest￿then they will not
shift agents￿beliefs about policy regime and will not induce changes in agents￿behavioral
rule, so that policy impacts can be reliably predicted by an identi￿ed VAR model.
We now investigate the e⁄ects of the systematic component of monetary policy. By
comparing the impulse responses under the original SVAR and the counterfactual one, we
are able to gauge the importance of systematic monetary policy in smoothing aggregate
￿ uctuations induced by various sources of shocks in the economy. These impulse responses
are displayed in Figure 2. Under the original SVAR, the federal funds rate is raised
in response to positive shocks to output, in￿ ation, and asset prices, whereas the rate is
unresponsive to the shocks in the counterfactual SVAR. In general, the responses of output
and in￿ ation to the structural disturbances are smaller under the original SVAR, meaning
that systematic monetary policy does help smooth output and in￿ ation.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
To evaluate quantitatively the di⁄erence made by shutting the responses of monetary
29policy to non-monetary shocks, Table 4 lists the cumulative values of impulse responses
over the ￿rst 20 quarters under the two SVARs. First look at the e⁄ects of the non-
policy shocks. As indicated in the table, the cumulative output response to output shock
(the most important source of output ￿ uctuations) under the benchmark SVAR is only
62% as large as that under the counterfactual. The output response to stock price shock
under the benchmark is only 27% of the response under the counterfactual. When moving
from the counterfactual to the benchmark, the cumulative responses of output to in￿ ation
and house price shocks turn positive to negative and become larger in absolute value.
However, the latter two shocks are the least important sources of output ￿ uctuations.
The stabilizing e⁄ect of the systematic monetary policy is even more pronounced when it
comes to in￿ ation. The cumulative responses of in￿ ation to all the four non-policy shocks
are all smaller under the benchmark as compared to the counterfactual. The cumulative
in￿ ation response to in￿ ation shock under the benchmark is only half of the response
under the counterfactual. Although the estimated systematic monetary policy does not
appear to respond directly to asset price movements, the responses of in￿ ation to the two
asset prices shocks are substantially smaller under the benchmark SVAR, where systematic
monetary policy applies.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Now turn to the e⁄ects of the monetary policy shock. It is striking that the estimated
systematic monetary policy succeeds in mitigating the e⁄ects of unpredictable shifts in
monetary policy, i.e., innovations to the federal funds rate. Switching from the counter-
30factual to the benchmark, the cumulative ￿rst 20-quarter decline of output in response to
a contractionary funds rate shock reduces from 1.42 percent to only 0.33 percent, while the
corresponding decline of in￿ ation reduces from 1.01 to 0.56 percentage point. This implies
that to the extent that disturbances to monetary policy making are unavoidable, having
a policy rule that dictates systematic reactions of the policy instrument to output and
in￿ ation movements actually helps avoid some of the economy￿ s ￿ uctuations that would
otherwise result from those disturbances.
Another surprising e⁄ect of the estimated monetary policy is that it turns out to help
bu⁄er house price from monetary policy shock as well as the non-policy shocks, despite
that the policy does not directly react to house price movements. In fact, reacting only
to output and in￿ ation movements allows systematic monetary policy to actually stabilize
house price to a large extent. The systematic policy reduces the cumulative house price
response to house price shock by 40% and the response to stock price shock by 65%.
In addition, it almost completely eliminates the impact of output shock on house price,
though it turns the cumulative response of house price to in￿ ation shock from positive
to a negative number larger in absolute value. Finally, the systematic policy reduces the
cumulative ￿rst 20-quarter decline of house price in response to a contractionary monetary
policy shock by half. In sharp contrast, the systematic monetary policy does not help
stabilize stock price by much.8 Hence the role of the systematic monetary policy on asset
price ￿ uctuations is quite asymmetric. Its has a substantial stabilizing e⁄ect on house
8Although the cumulative decline of stock price in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock
also decreases under the benchmark relative to the counterfactual, it results from the cancellation of some
of the negative responses within the ￿rst 11 quarters by the positive responses after 11 quarters, the
cancellation only present under the benchmark.
31price but not on stock price.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated empirically the dynamic interactions between asset
prices, monetary policy, and aggregate ￿ uctuations during the Volcker-Greenspan period.
Several robust ￿ndings emerge out of four di⁄erent speci￿cations of SVARs falling within
the short-run recursiveness scheme. The systematic response of monetary policy to output
and in￿ ation is found to play an important role in stabilizing the aggregate economy. Our
results call for special attention to be paid to house price when studying the dynamic
relationships between asset prices and the macroeconomy. In future research other iden-
ti￿cation strategies, such as long-run restrictions (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) and sign
restrictions (Faust, 1998; Canova and Nicolo, 2002; Uhlig, 2005), can be explored. The
di⁄erent identi￿cation schemes can also be combined using Bayesian techniques as in Las-
trapes (1998). Simple as it is, the framework adopted in the present paper have appeared
to deliver a rich set of important results. On another front, the focus on a historical period
where monetary policy is conducted in a relatively consistent manner has led us to work
with the Volcker-Greenspan period. It is an important task in future research to study the
interactions between asset prices, macroeconomic performance, and the ￿unconventional￿
monetary policy.
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Figure 1a. Impulse Responses under extended CEE 
Note: The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals for the impulse responses. 
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Figure 1b. Impulse Responses under Flexible Monetary Policy 
Note: The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals for the impulse responses. 39 
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Figure 1c. Impulse Responses under Sluggish Monetary Policy 
Note: The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals for the impulse responses. 
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Figure 1d. Impulse Responses under Extended Iacoviello 
Note: The dashed lines represent 90% confidence intervals for the impulse responses. 40 
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses under Benchmark vs. Counterfactual 
Solid lines: benchmark, dashed lines: counterfactual 
 41 
 




  Standard deviation 
Real GDP  0.013 
Inflation  0.006 
Federal funds rate  0.016 
House price  0.016 





  Real GDP  Inflation  Funds rate  House price  Stock price 
Real GDP  1.00         
Inflation  0.26  1.00       
Funds rate  0.42  0.76  1.00     
House price  0.43  0.49  0.37  1.00   






Table 2. Variance Decomposition: Extended CEE 
 
Quarters 
Y  π 
Y shock  π shock  qH shock  qS shock  R shock  Y shock  π shock  qH shock  qS shock  R shock 




















































































































































Table 2 (con’t). Variance Decomposition: Extended CEE 
 
Quarters 
qH  qS 
Y shock  π shock  qH shock  qS shock  R shock  Y shock  π shock  qH shock  qS shock  R shock 




















































































































































Table 2 (con’t). Variance Decomposition: Extended CEE 
 
Quarters 
R   
Y shock  π shock  qH shock  qS shock  R shock           










         










         










         










         










         










         










         
 
 
Note: The entries are percentage contributions of the shocks to the forecast error variances. The numbers in parentheses denote 90% confidence intervals. 45 
 
Table 3. The Estimated A Matrices 
 
A0: Extended CEE 
1  0  0  0  0 
0.026 


















(0.620)  1 
 
A0: Flexible Monetary Policy 
1  0  0  0  0 
0.026 


















(0.080)*  1 
 
A0: Sluggish Monetary Policy 
1  0  0  0  0 
0.194 


















(0.606)  1 
 
A0: Extended Iacoviello 
1  0  0  0  0 
0.060 






















Table 3 (con’t) 
 









































































































Note: (1) The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * denotes statistical significance at 90% level, ** at 
95% level. (2) The A₁ and A2 matrices are the same under all the four specifications, up to permutation of the 
rows and columns according to the ordering of variables. (3) The shaded lines correspond to the monetary 
policy equations. 47 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Impulse Responses: Benchmark vs. Counterfactual 
 
  Output response  Inflation response  House price response  Stock price response 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Output shock  1.53  2.47  0.14  0.64  -0.05  1.84  -0.23  1.00 
Inflation shock  -0.91  0.12  0.64  1.29  -1.80  0.45  -1.40  0.20 
Funds rate shock  -0.33  -1.42  -0.56  -1.01  -1.81  -3.62  -3.49  -6.08 
House price shock  -0.88  0.20  0.80  1.22  2.79  4.67  5.35  6.63 
Stock price shock  0.49  1.79  0.68  1.22  1.28  3.65  16.07  17.37 
 
Note:  Column  (1):  Cumulative  impulse  responses  in  the  first  twenty  periods  after  the  shocks  under  the 
benchmark SVAR. Column (2): Cumulative impulse responses in the first twenty periods after the shocks under 
the counterfactual SVAR. 
 